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This paper connects the rise of Sikh Fundamentalist movements in the 1980s, which sparked a 
widespread consciousness of a Sikh nationhood, to a history of imperialism that both led to 
smallholders’ economic precariousness and encouraged an exclusive, masculine Sikh identity 
over time. Through a process of friction, which considers a history rooted in political economy, 
both smallholders and young educated men joined the agitation against the central government as 
it refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the demands highlighted in the Anandpur Resolution. 
The British first facilitated wide-scale agricultural commodification and along with urban Sikhs, 
advocated for an exclusive Sikh identity. The Indian state, during Import Substitution 
Industrialization, built on Britain’s economic institutions, favoring regions such as Bangalore 
and Hyderabad for the fruition of the software industry. Punjab, however, remained India’s 
‘breadbasket’ as the Indian government, along with other western international actors, 
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From British Colonization to the Green Revolution: Legacies of Imperialism on the 
Development of a Sikh Consciousness of Nationhood in the 1980s  
During Operation Bluestar, Prime Minister Gandhi devastated the holiest gurdwara1 in 
Sikhism, the Golden Temple, which further gave rise to Sikh militancy and outrage during the 
late 1980s. With the operation, Prime Minister Gandhi attempted to arrest Sant Bhindranwale,2 
who led the militant Sikh Fundamentalist movements of the 1980s, sparking a Sikh 
consciousness of nationhood. In this paper, I employ a historical perspective rooted in political 
economy to analyze the legacies of imperialism, starting with British colonization and continuing 
with the Green Revolution, that produced friction expressed as Sikh Fundamentalist Resistance 
in the 1980s. Such movements were the results of imperial legacies that both degraded 
smallholders’ economic positions over time and further encouraged an exclusive, masculine Sikh 
identity.  
The British, along with urban Sikh reformers, set the impetus for Sikh resistances in the 
1980s by encouraging a keshdhari and Khalsa Dhari Sikh identity. Furthermore, through large-
scale agricultural commodification, the colonial state laid the groundwork for smallholders’ 
attraction to Sant Bhindranwale’s militant movements, both exacerbating smallholders’ 
economic positions and fueling tensions between the central government and Punjab during the 
Green Revolution. During Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI), the Indian government 
built on Britain’s economic institutions, neglecting to advance Punjab’s industry, which led 
                                                
1 Sikh holy place of worship  
2 Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale (June 2, 1947-June 6, 1984) was the leader of the militant organization, the Damdami 
Taksal. He is portrayed as the symbolic leader of the Sikh revolutionary movement against the central government’s 
oppressive policies in Punjab. He advocated for a strict, fundamentalist interpretation of Sikhism. Bhindranwale did 
not survive Operation Blue Star, when Indira Gandhi ordered the Indian army to raid the Golden Temple in an effort 
to remove both him and his supporters. To Sikhs, Bhindranwale is considered a martyr. 
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young educated men to join Sant Bhindranwale’s movements in the 1980s as they remained 
unemployed both industrially and agriculturally.  
In this paper, I first contextualize my argument in relation to other scholars such as Shiva, 
Purewal, and Chopra. Then, I discuss the impact of British colonization on Punjabi society: as 
the colonial state led smallholders to engage in petty commodity production, smallholders’ took 
on debt, which attracted them to the financial advantages offered by the military. I also analyze 
how the British state advocated for a distinct, masculine form of Sikhism. Subsequently, I shift to 
the ISI period in order to discern the industries and regions the Indian state favored as it built on 
Britain’s institutions. While Punjab received education and infrastructural funding during this 
period, the Indian government continued to treat it as an agricultural breadbasket. Finally, in the 
last section, I use Tsing’s framework of friction to illustrate the Green Revolution’s 
consequences for emergence of Sikh Fundamentalist movements rooted in a historical, political 
economy context. I focus in particular on the plight of young men and smallholders in order to 
extrapolate their motivations in joining militant Sikh resistance movements. 
Below, I explain the arguments of scholars such as Shiva (1991) and Purewal (1998) who 
trace the emergence of Sikh resistance movements in the 1980s to the Green Revolution. While 
Shiva (1991) emphasizes both the intensification and commodification the Green Revolution 
produced, Purewal (1998) employs a class-based perspective in his arguments. Chopra (2008), 
on the other hand, asserts that the rise of Sikh movements can be attributed both to electoral 
politics and Sikhism’s distinctiveness as a religion in India.  
 
Sikh Resistance Movements in the 1980s 
Shiva (1991) argues that the rise of Sikh Fundamentalism in the 1980s (which I claim 
sparked a Sikh consciousness of nationhood) can be attributed to the Green Revolution. She 
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posits that the intensification processes the Green Revolution required put pressure on political 
systems, fueling conflicts between the central government and Punjab. According to Shiva 
(1991, pp. 164-166), conflicts erupted over the central government’s efforts to centralize 
Punjab’s water boards. While conflict with the central government played a role in the 
emergence of Sikh movements, they also emerged as a response to the homogenization the 
Green Revolution produced: agricultural commodification stripped away the sacridity of 
traditional forms of society, creating an ethical vacuum where everything entailed a price (Shiva, 
1991, p. 174). In order to correct the ‘moral issue’ of commodification, Sikh ‘revival’ 
movements emerged (Shiva, 1991, p. 175). According to Shiva (1991), the motivation for the 
rise of Sikh movements can be reduced to the Green Revolution itself.  
 Purewal (1998), among others, employs a class perspective to explain the rise of Sikh 
resistance movements in the 1980s. He perceives Sikh movements as “ethnonationalist,” 
occurring as a result of a class struggle between Sikh capitalist farmers and the Hindu industrial 
bourgeoisie of India (Purewal, 1998, p. i). He explains that the transition to capitalism in 
Punjab’s agriculture (the Green Revolution) allowed a powerful class of capitalist farmers (the 
Kulaks) to own the majority of the state’s land. The Kulaks used the ideology of Sikhism to bond 
with the marginal, landless Sikh peasantry in an effort to dominate the commercial Hindu 
bourgeoisie. Militant Kulak units fought with the central government, which defended the 
interests of the Hindu bourgeoisie. The Kulaks demanded transferring jurisdictions to the 
provinces or calling for complete independence from India, leading Sikh ethno nationalistic 
movements (Purewal, 1998, p. ii). Purewal points to the class conflicts between the Hindu urban 
bourgeoisie class and the Sikh rural class as the source leading to the emergence of Sikh 
movements in the 1980s.  
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 Other scholars, such as Chopra (2008, pp. 191-192), argue that the preeminence of 
Khalistan (the Sikh nation-state) can be attributed to Sikhism’s distinctiveness in the larger 
nation and as a product of Indian politics. Chopra characterizes the formulation of Khalistan as 
part of a historical emphasis that held Sikhism distinctive linguistically, ethnically, and 
religiously. In addition, the Indian government attempted to fracture the Akali Party by 
supporting Sant Bhindranwale. Simultaneously, however, the Congress Party also joined hands 
with the Akalis. Later on, Sant Bhindranwale garnered the support of young men, leading them 
in agitation for the creation of Khalistan (the Sikh nation-state). Chopra contends Sant 
Bhindranwale’s strength was also a product of the Congress Party’s electoral politics as they first 
aided his rise.  
 My research contributes to this literature by taking seriously the legacies of imperial 
histories, beginning with British colonization and continuing with the Green Revolution, that 
fueled the rise of Sikh Fundamentalist Movements in the 1980s, sparking a Sikh consciousness 
of nationhood. Nor the Green Revolution or the analysis of a ‘capitalist’ class during this period 
alone can account for the dominance of Sikh Fundamentalist movements as a marketized system 
of agriculture began well before the Green Revolution: the British first began the project of 
transforming Punjab into a “breadbasket” through large scale agricultural commodification. 
Furthermore, while Chopra attributes the Sikh movements to Sikhism’s distinction religiously, 
Sikh identity is not static over time. As I will show, beginning with colonization, the British 
advocated for a masculine, exclusive Sikh identity by encouraging reformation movements that 
aided their goals of recruiting Sikhs in the army.  
 
British Colonization: Agricultural Commodification & the Exclusivity of Sikhism  
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In this section, I describe how Britain transformed land tenure through agricultural 
commodification, which substantially contributed to smallholders’ economic vulnerabilities and 
incentivized army recruitment. By also considering Sikhs a martial caste, the British led efforts, 
along with urban Sikhs, to promote a keshdhari version of Sikhism that differentiated Sikhs from 
the ‘shaven’ Hindus. Both agricultural commodification and recruiting Sikhs in the army served 
the imperial interests of the British state as they sought to uphold their political dominance 
abroad and export cash crops to fund their own global hegemony. While Britain favored 
cultivating cash crops such as wheat in Punjab, they neglected to invest in Punjab’s industrial 
sector despite Punjabi leaders’ desires to do so. I begin with Britain’s transformation of Punjab 
into an agricultural ‘basket’ and a short briefing on the annexation of Punjab.  
The British first annexed Punjab in 1849 for its strategic position as a barrier to outside 
invaders. Punjab historically served as a frontier region where invaders entered into India; it also 
acted as a barrier to the Russian threat. To the colonial state, annexing Punjab was important for 
preserving British security in India (Jalal and Bose, 1997, p. 65). Securing Punjab proved a 
challenge, as it strongly resisted Britain’s colonizing attempts (Jalal and Bose, 1997, p. 65). After 
Maharaja Ranjit Singh’s death, the British took advantage of a split Punjabi society in order to 
finally secure the region (Jalal and Bose, 1997, p. 64). Jamu Gulab Singh, a courtier of the 
Lahore Kingdom, helped the British secure Punjab; he was rewarded with the Treaty of Amritsar 
of 1846, which transferred the valley of Kashmir to him in exchange for money (Jalal and Bose, 
1997, p. 65). The British also fought the Sikhs in the two Anglo-Sikh wars before they affected 
control over the region (Jalal and Bose, 1997, p. 65).  
 
Agricultural Commodification: Systems of Land Tenure and Cash Crops  
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The British organized Punjabi colonies into Mahalwari land revenue settlements--as 
opposed to Raiyatwari or Zamindari systems--as they sought to exploit the region agriculturally 
(Sarwar 2012). In Bengal, the Zamindari systems were more common, while the Raiyatwari 
systems remained prominent in Madras and Bombay (Sarwar, 2012, p. 16). In the North West, 
including Punjab, the British created Mahalwari systems, which varied in implementation over 
time. Under such a system, entire bodies of villagers were jointly and separately responsible for 
the revenue extraction of the entire village (Sarwar, 2012, p. 19). While under the Zamindari 
system, the British set a distinct intermediary (or zamindar) bound by contract in order to collect 
land revenues, Mahalwari systems also included an intermediary, though they were more 
proprietary and held the settlement (Sarwar, 2012, p. 21).  
The colonial rulers transformed Punjab’s land into intensified systems of irrigation, 
which involved growing cash crops. In particular, during the formation of the famous Chenab 
colony, the Chenab river was transformed into a system of perennial canals (Barrier, 1967, p. 
356). The British considered the Chenab colony its “model” colony, using it as a blueprint as 
they sought to transform other areas in Punjab. Overall, in the colony, six million acres of desert 
land were converted into systems of intensive irrigation (Talbot, 2012, p. 7). The British 
introduced cash crops, including wheat, tobacco, sugarcane, and cotton at the expense of 
traditional crops (Talbot, 2012, p. 5). By the end of the 1920s, Punjab produced a tenth of India’s 
total crop production and a third of its wheat; its per capita crop output increased by forty-five 
percent between 1891 and 1921 (Talbot, 2012, p. 5).  
Wheat was an important cash crop because of its export value. In the Chenab, Jhelum, 
and Lower Bari colonies, wheat alone made up more than thirty-percent of all cultivated areas 
(Ali, 2014, p. 224). In other areas, it sometimes made up half of all cultivated land due to the 
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abundant supply of canal water, and commanded high prices since it was primarily grown as an 
export crop. New varieties of wheat were created in order to fulfill the needs of the British 
market; the English, under Forbes Watson, tested more than one thousand samples of Indian 
wheat (“Agrarian Conditions of Punjab,” p. 8). Traditional red wheat started to be replaced by 
white wheat, as the British favored the latter for bread and flour (Ali, 2014, p. 244).  
 The British encouraged farmers to cultivate another cash crop, cotton, to support their 
own textile market (Ali, 2014, p. 225). Although cotton was not as popular in the early years of 
colonization, from 1910 to 1940, the proportion of cotton increased by fifty percent in both the 
Jhelum and Chenab colony; in the Lower Doabi colony, cotton cultivation at times equaled the 
production of wheat (Ali, 2014, p. 225). Furthermore, the British Cotton Growing Association 
(BCGA) received a grant of 7,500 acres for the cultivation of cotton; the grant was the largest 
given to a metropolitan commercial organization in the colonies (Ali, 2014, p. 226). The BCGA 
bred seeds for positive traits, managing crops that were later exported to textile mills in 
Lancashire (Ali, 2014, p. 226): colonial innovation adapted American long staple cotton to 
Punjab’s soil and climate (Ali, 2014, p. 225). More than one thousand samples of Indian wheat 
were tested in England under Forbes Watson (“Agrarian Conditions of Punjab,” p. 8). The 
British strategically chose cash crops, such as cotton, based on their profitability as exports.  
 While colonialists privileged Punjab as their ‘breadbasket’ region, they neglected to build 
an adequate industrial sector. Colonial governor Sir Malcolm Hailey rejected proposals of 
constructing sugarcane, wine, or canning factories because such industrial pursuits did not align 
with Britain’s goals for Punjab (Ali, 2014, p. 40). Instead, the colonial state targeted 
‘engineering’ efforts towards producing cash crops for export, rejected proposals for 
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manufacturing as they favored others regions in India for industry, which I will further elaborate 
on in section two.  
Agricultural commodification, including prioritizing cash crops, degraded smallholders’ 
economic positions. Both agricultural prices and wages began to be controlled by the market. 
Commodification transformed peasants into commodity producers, growing cash crops to earn 
money (Fox, 1985, p. 38). The colonial government encouraged smallholders to engage in petty 
commodity production as smallholders only secured roughly twenty-five acres of land (Fox, 
1985, p. 43). Smallholders largely relied on labor-intensive means of cultivation, while larger 
farmers could afford more technologically advanced inputs (Ali, 2014, p. 231).  
In 1876-1877 and 1886-1887, moneylenders began accepting land as a security loan 
because the increases in mortgages produced economic difficulties for smallholders (“Agrarian 
Conditions of Punjab,” p. 10). As a response to the growing power of moneylenders, the colonial 
government passed the Land Alienation Act of 1900 Bill in an attempt to protect agriculturalists 
from moneylenders by restricting land from the non-cultivating castes (“Agrarian Conditions of 
Punjab,” p. 11). The bill, however, did not save small-scale farmers: the lack of co-operative 
movements and other forms of credit only deepened smallholders’ economic insecurities 
(“Agrarian Conditions of Punjab,” p. 11).  
As a result, smallholder debt increased: while the debt of British India as whole remained 
at Rs. 900 crores, Punjab’s total share persisted at Rs. 135 crores (“Agrarian Conditions of 
Punjab,” p. 12). Punjab contained seven percent of British India’s population, but its share of 
debt exceeded fifteen percent of India’s total (“Agrarian Conditions of Punjab,” p. 12). The 
marketization of agriculture augmented smallholders’ economic vulnerabilities as moneylenders’ 
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power grew and the colonial state neglected to institute sufficient social protections to protect 
smallholders.  
 
Militarization & Reformation Movements  
 One way smallholders could alleviate their financial struggles was through military 
service (Fox, 1985, p. 43). Colonial authorities depended on Punjab for army recruitment for 
their imperial army (Fox, 1985, p. 43). The rising burden of debt led smallholders to seek out 
opportunities in the army even though they paid a low wage (Fox, 1985, p. 44). The British 
shepherded Punjabi smallholders into the Indian army: during World War I, more than sixty-five 
percent of Indian combat troops originated from Punjab (Fox, 1985, p. 44).  
In order to encourage smallholders to join the army during World War I, Britain offered 
financial advantages in the form of land grants. However, only some soldiers received land 
grants (Fox, 1985, p. 44). In the Nili Bar colony (established from 1925 to 1940), well-
established families obtained land grants of 4000 acres each (Ali, 2014, p. 5); in the latter half of 
the century, though, the British preserved nine percent of the land for army pensioners (Ali, 
1985, p. 38). Sikh soldiers often complained about and protested the inferior pay of Indian troops 
compared to British troops’ wages (Fox, 1985, p. 44). Following World War I, military 
recruitment played an increasingly significant, sustaining role in central Punjab than in other 
regions.  
 While financial incentives factored prominently in Sikhs’ decision to join the army, the 
British also considered Sikhs a ‘martial’ caste. The British perceived Sikhism as a ‘rational,’ 
‘progressive’ religion due to its monotheism, rejection of idols and priests, and repudiation of 
caste (Ballantyne, 2006, p. 308). The British compared the founder of Sikhism, Guru Nanak Dev 
Ji, to Martin Luther, as they considered Guru Nanak Dev Ji to be a reformer of Hinduism 
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(Ballantyne, 2006, p. 249). Aligned with urban Sikhs, the British advocated for a ‘rational,’ 
‘masculine’ form of Sikhism in the countryside, where Sikhs commonly worshipped Hindu 
deities and intermarried with Hindus (Fox, 1985, p. 110).  
 The reformation movements, led by the urban Sikhs under the Tat Khalsa3, promoted a 
‘pure,’ ‘masculine’ form of Sikhism, which involved convincing Sikhs in the countryside to 
abandon folk traditions and superstitions (Ballantyne, 2006, p. 297). The British administration 
feared the decay of Sikhism if it was not separated from Hinduism (Ballantyne, 2006, p. 289). 
Through meetings, preaching, and handing pamphlets, the Tat Khalsa advocated for both theirs 
and the colonial state’s version on Sikh identity; it included an emphasis on kes (which also 
involved keeping a turban, along with hair) and the five K’s (Ballantyne, 2006, pp. 298).4 Urban 
Sikhs reformed rural Sikhs’ death rituals, naming rituals, and marriage practices (Ballantyne, 
2006, pp. 316-322). Both the Tat Khalsa and colonial state encouraged an exclusive, masculine 
Sikh identity.  
Sikh masculinity was predicated on the inferiority of Hindu masculinity while white 
colonists positioned themselves as superior to all men. Sikhism’s ‘martial sensibility’ 
characterized by the turbaned, keshdhari (keeping hair) male, led the British to perceive it as a 
masculine faith (Ballantyne, 2006, pp. 328, 308). Colonials favored Khalsa Dhari (followers of 
the Sikh panth) Sikhs in part because they embodied Sikh masculinity from their outward 
‘martially sensible’ appearance and their demonstration of the five k’s. Both Khalsa Dhari and 
keshdhari Sikhs’ appearance includes facial hair and the keeping of one’s hair, which is distinct 
                                                
3 The Tat Khalsa is a faction of the Singh Sabha movement that advocated for an independent Sikh identity 
(Ballantyne, 2006, p. 65). In 1888, Tat Khalsa leaders insisted to the colonial government that Sikhs should not be 
confounded with Hindus (Ballantyne, 2006, p. 66).  
4 The five K’s are the physical symbols of faith worn by Sikhs. They date back to the creation of the Khalsa Panth 
by Guru Gobind Singh Ji. The five K’s each carry an important meaning in the Sikh faith. They include Kesh (uncut 
hair), Kara (steel bracelet), Kanga (comb), Kaccha (cotton underwear), and Kirpan (sword). 
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from Hindu men who do not keep hair. Thus, the British incentivized deepening distinctions 
between Hindu and Sikh identity, which later created tensions when Hindu nationalists 
constructed the nation of India on the precedent of a Hindu identity.  
 Because the British thought Sikh men expressed more ‘civility’ than Hindu men, 
colonial ideals of Sikh masculinity were also predicated on the superiority of Sikh men over 
Hindu men. White colonizers considered themselves more superior, ‘rational,’ and ‘civil’ than 
anyone else. The British favored a particular masculine, exclusive Sikh identity as they recruited 
Sikhs as soldiers in the World Wars and as a police force in Hong Kong (Ballantyne, 2006, p. 
369).  
 
Post World War I & the Great Economic Depression   
After World War I, smallholders’ economic position became even more precarious as 
petty commodity production deteriorated and the British cut military remittances (Fox, 1985, pp. 
76-77). Unequal market competition, unequal exchange in the colonies, and eroding social 
protections also exacerbated smallholders’ economic positions (Fox, 1985, p. 77). Upon 
returning home, Sikh soldiers struggled to sustain their families after the colonial government 
stopped issuing military remittances due to their own fiscal problems. Furthermore, both 
waterlogging problems and decreasing canal grants also induced cultivation problems for 
smallholders (Fox, 1985, p. 77).  
While smallholders already shouldered debt as a result of agricultural marketization, the 
Great Depression from 1929 to 1933 exacerbated smallholders’ already vulnerable economic 
positions (“Agrarian Conditions of Punjab,” p. 12). The shift from kind to cash revenues in the 
1920s led smallholders to borrow money at harsher terms and conditions (“Agrarian Conditions 
of Punjab,” p. 9). As water rates, land revenues, agricultural imports, and land prices increased 
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(Fox, 1985, p. 77), more than eighty percent of smallholders acquired more debt as a 
consequence of the transition (“Agrarian Conditions of Punjab,” p. 9). 
Moreover, food grain prices fell, which created immense economic difficulties for 
smallholders engaged in petty commodity production (“Agrarian Conditions of Punjab,” p. 10). 
As a result of the worldwide fall in food prices, smallholders earned less for their produce 
(“Agrarian Conditions of Punjab,” p. 12). They could not pay their land revenues, and were 
displaced from ancestral lands (“Agrarian Conditions of Punjab,” p. 10). The Punjab Legislative 
Assembly attempted to pass several laws to assist smallholders by reducing land revenues by 
thirty to fifty percent, but the colonial government did not pass them (“Agrarian Conditions of 
Punjab,” p. 13). As co-operative movements also failed, by 1929, the total debt of the peasantry 
rose to 1350 million rupees (“Agrarian Conditions of Punjab,” p. 13). As their land inevitably 
transferred to moneylenders, many agriculturalists were forced to work as landless laborers 
(“Agrarian Conditions of Punjab,” p. 13).  
Smallholders’ economic situation deteriorated along with the marketization of 
agriculture, which worsened in the face of worldwide economic shocks, thus exacerbating their 
financial instability. During such times of immense economic volatility, smallholders resisted 
colonial government, which at times included military resistance.  
In sum, in addition to privileging Punjab as the “breadbasket” region, the colonial state 
continued to favor a masculine, exclusive Sikh identity, which aided their goals of recruiting 
Sikhs in the military. Because of their tenuous economic situation, smallholders joined the ranks 
of the army due to the financial incentives it provided; though, even those degraded when 
soldiers arrived home after World War I. As the colonial state refused to invest in industrial 
policies or substantially aid smallholders’ situation, they remained in extremely fragile, 
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dangerous financial situations. Instead of providing more non-rural employment options in 
Punjab, the British privileged other regions, such as Maharashtra and Karnataka, as their 
industrial centers, which the Indian state built on during ISI.  
 
Import Substitution Industrialization: Building on Britain’s Economic Institutions  
In this section, I argue the Indian state continued to favor historically privileged centers 
through its investments during the ISI period, which led to particular regions’ advancement 
during the period of trade liberalization. The ISI period entailed the development of industry in a 
protected, inward environment (Franko, 2007, p. 59). It involved active industrial policy, 
protective international instruments, and an accommodationst fiscal and monetary policy with 
transnational participation (Franko, 2007, p. 61). Throughout the ISI period, the Indian state 
largely neglected Punjab’s industrial growth by continuing to use it as an agricultural region, 
building on Britain’s agricultural institutions. 
 First, I will explain the necessity of ISI post-independence as I draw on debates that 
attempt to determine the general successes and failures of ISI broadly (namely, outward 
orientation versus protectionism). Second, I turn to India’s ISI experience, illuminating its 
successes and failures, as well as its strategies. Third, I analyze the software industry in order to 
illustrate both the regions and industries that benefited the most from ISI. Finally, I show how 
the Indian state continued to invest in labor-intensive, agriculturally related industries in Punjab, 
maintaining its role as a ‘breadbasket.’   
States that had recently obtained independence turned to the protection afforded by ISI in 
order to be more competitive in the world economy. Before ISI, ‘developing’ countries regularly 
traded primary goods for more advanced, technological ones (Franko, 2007, pp. 58-59). It is 
important to note that agricultural products comprised a low income elasticity due to the decline 
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of the relative demand of primary goods as economies grew (Franko, 2007, p. 59).‘Developed’ 
countries that exported technologically-advanced products reaped substantial profits in the world 
economy as technological entrepreneurship surged the market price well beyond that of basic 
inputs (Franko, 2007, p. 59). By primarily trading commodities, the economies of developing 
countries also remained vulnerable to shocks (Bruton, 1989, p. 1603).  
To gain leverage in the world economy, developed countries facilitated the process of 
learning to create technologically advanced products on their own. The North continued to 
control both labor and firms with monopoly power (Bruton, 1998, p. 905). Market failure alone 
could not explain the need for ISI in developing nations; rather, it was the division of labor 
between rich countries and poor ones that led the latter to poverty. Even the industrial centers of 
developing countries remained strongholds of western powers. With ISI, developing countries 
could gain autonomy from the power interests of the most economically robust nations over 
time, and could eventually forge their own paths toward development (Bruton, 1989, p. 1603). 
  In order to forge their paths of development, developing countries instituted ISI, which 
entailed both economic protectionism and government intervention. The development process is 
depicted as one with a thin neck: inputs were constrained from flowing freely from the bottle 
through the restrictive neck as technology, infrastructure, and entrepreneurial capital were scarce 
(Franko, 2007, p. 60). Backward linkages stimulated supplier chain growth while forward 
linkages facilitated their growth further along in the supplier industry (Hirschman, 1998, pp. 6-
7). 
Furthermore, governments protected their economies through high tariffs, which allowed 
their own firms to develop the necessary conditions to innovate and begin the process of 
technological advancement (Franko, 2007, p. 63). Tariffs were also imposed on intermediate 
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goods. States subsidized domestic firms, granting both tax credits and soft credit in order to 
jumpstart the industrial sector (Franko, 2007, p. 64). States’ also implemented protective walls so 
that less competitive, infant industries could gain the chance to become as competitive as large 
multinational firms (Franko, 2007, p. 63).  
 The protectionism of ISI is often compared to export-orientation strategies. Countries in 
East Asia exhibited higher rates of growth and Total Factor Productivity Growth (TFPG) than 
other countries practicing ISI, dubbing it the “East Asian Miracle.” East Asia’s export-driven 
strategy was lauded as the source of its remarkable success (Bruton, 1998, p. 929). The World 
Development Report (1987) suggested Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong were more successful 
than other countries due to their outward- orientation; for example, their real manufacturing 
value added averaged 15.6% growth from 1963 to 1973 (Bruton, 1998, p. 928). According to the 
literature, as result of policies that opened their countries in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
respectively, China and India also achieved sharp increases in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
agriculture, industry, and exports (Bruton, 1998, p. 928). Countries that did not open their 
economies drastically, including those in Latin America, the Ivory Coast, and Kenya, according 
to the World Bank, ended up with lower growth rates than those that did (Bruton, 1998, p. 928).  
 Bruton (1998, p. 929) argues that shifts in economic paradigms such as ‘outward-
orientation’ are not plausible explanations for assessing ISI’s successes and failures. Instead, he 
argues fostering cultures of knowledge accumulation are more important to determining the 
success of economic programs. Bruton (1998, p. 929) explains strong indigenous learning 
processes entail on-the-job learning, learning by doing, and using technology. Furthermore, if 
done correctly, protection from Import Substitution Industrialization could successfully foster 
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learning in firms. Governments, too, can play important roles in implementing policies to foster 
cultures of learning (Bruton, 1998, p. 931).  
 Bruton (1998, pp. 921, 922, 931) posits that ‘initial conditions’ are important for 
determining outcomes of learning accumulation. He argues East Asia’s success could be 
attributed to its experience of colonization: Japan as a colonizer facilitated collective learning 
environments that encouraged innovation. Latin America’s colonizing experience, varying by 
region, also shaped the extent of its ability to foster cultures of knowledge accumulation, 
especially as inequality continues to remain a pressing issue.  
 
India’s Experience of ISI  
 India’s ‘initial conditions’ as a former colony shaped its economic nationalistic rhetoric, 
specifically regarding its promotion of ISI as the national economic strategy. After 
independence, previously colonized countries turned to economic nationalism to promote 
industry (Amsden, 2004, p. 77). Nationally owned firms had a greater incentive than foreign 
owned ones to take the lead on ISI in efforts to encourage local cultures of knowledge (Amsden, 
2004, p. 77). Often, national ownership and government initiative is greater in countries with a 
colonial prewar manufacturing experience, but national ownership is less clear in countries 
marked by the emigre experience, where the distinction between foreign and national is often 
unclear. This is particularly true in regions marked by extremely violent histories of colonization 
(Amsden, 2004, p. 78).  
 After British independence, India began a national effort to develop technologically 
advanced industry. Shortly after British independence, India developed an indigenous variant of 
Keynesianism under Nehru’s government: a ‘mixed economy’ approach through which the 
government strove to invest in the public sector (Ahmed, 2009, p. 38). Nehru's government 
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favored heavy industry, and invested in railways, machinery, and steel (Kohli, 2012, pp. 83-84): 
under the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1948, the Indian government secured a monopoly over 
developing minerals, iron and steel industries, including shipbuilding (Kulkarni and Meister, 
2008, p. 7). With the Essential Commodities Act of 1955, the government expanded price-
controls in steel, cement, drug, automobile, and chemical industries (Kulkarni and Meister, 2008, 
p. 7).  
As an example, it is worth looking at the differences between Korean and Indian 
domestic policies in order to assess the ‘successes’ and ‘failures’ of ISI. Compared to Korea, 
India gained in its technological maturity, but did not obtain high rates of total factor 
productivity growth (TFPG). In the later half of the 1950s, India resorted to protecting its 
imports in the manufacturing industry: import availability ratios substantially declined from 1960 
to 1965 (Bruton, 1989, p. 1620). However, in the mid-1960s, India adopted more of an export-
oriented strategy rather than adhering strictly to ISI. In the final half of the 1960s, the average 
annual rate of manufacturing exports fell to less than five percent, but increased fifteen percent 
per annum from 1967-68. Korea also focused on an export-oriented strategy during the 1960s. 
From 1973-1080s, Korea’s manufacturing average was at almost ten percent per annum, which 
was substantially larger than other countries (Bruton, 1989, p. 1622). TFPG remained largely 
negative in India, but positive for Korea during ISI. Although India lagged behind in terms of 
TFPG, its technological growth was impressive: India imported more technology than both 
Brazil and Korea, creating a comprehensive technological base in its capital goods protection 
(Bruton, 1989, p. 1631).  
Because India favored capital-intensive industries, it also failed to usurp enough labor to 
involve poorer segments of the population. The Heckscher-Ohlin Model considers capital or 
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labor intensity for a country; because India has traditionally been labor-abundant, it should have 
theoretically specialized in industries requiring larger amounts of labor, such as agriculture and 
textile goods. Because countries like India sought to catch up with richer countries, it was 
necessary for them to build capital-intensive industries that required technological maturity 
(Kulkarni and Meister, 2008, pp. 8-9). Nevertheless, poverty remained a large problem in India 
in spite of ISI. 
 India’s poorest regions still did not significantly develop throughout ISI despite the pro-
poor rhetoric of Indian politicians. Bottlenecks remained a problem, as they inhibited India’s 
growth due to poor infrastructure. Under Nehru’s government, the commitment to alleviating 
poverty was more rhetorical than action-led, despite state-directed efforts (Kohli, 2012, p. 85). 
Discussing redistribution was a rhetorical strategy--it was never actually put into practice. In 
fact, industry remained concentrated in a few Indian regions that were historically privileged, 
particularly during colonization. The software industry, as discussed below, emerged from 
supply side conditions created during ISI in India’s historically favored centers.  
 
ISI: Software Industry Hubs  
 ISI policies fueled investment in institutions of higher learning, stimulating the supply 
side conditions that led to the growth of software hubs (Patibandla et al., 2000, p. 1263). For 
example, the government of India invested in the Indian Institute of Technology, a well-
regarded, nation-wide education center (Patibandla et al., 2000, p. 1263). The government also 
invested in defense research and other areas of the public sector during ISI. This was because the 
private sector would not make these necessary investments due to the inherent competition with 
large tech giants that dominated the market (Patibandla et al., 2000, p. 1264).  
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 In addition to public sector investments such as education, the government instituted 
software industry parks and provided support to private firms. The Indian software industry 
originally began in Bombay in the late 1970s in the Santa Cruz Electronics Processing Zone 
(SEEPZ) (Patibandla et al., 2000, p. 1267). However, a shortage in skilled labor led the industry 
to shift to Bangalore due to its larger supply of skilled labor. The Indian government also 
invested in elite institutions of science, including electronics, aeronautics, and various machine 
tools during ISI; these, too, were concentrated in the city (Patibandla et al., 2000, p. 1267).  
 Software clusters concentrated in Bangalore (Karnataka), Hyderabad (Telangana), 
Chennai (Tamil Nadu), and Pune (Maharashtra) during the period of trade liberalization due to 
their ‘initial advantages’ during colonization. Bombay was historically privileged as one of the 
centers of industry and commerce. After independence, larger landholdings were broken into 
smaller ones. During colonization, Gujarat and Maharashtra housed manufacturing centers, with 
strong ties to business (Kohli, 2012, p. 191) while Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh provided 
strong service industries to the colonial state (Kohli, 2012, p. 122). Because industrial 
infrastructure already inhabited these regions, the Indian government built on it during Import 
Substitution Industrialization.  
The Indian government built on these areas’ infrastructural advantages by further 
investing in education and infrastructure, contributing to software firms’ success during trade 
liberalization. In addition to its advantage in education, Bangalore also had the infrastructure in 
place for a booming software industry (Patibandla et al., 2000, p. 1267). Additional clusters 
formed in Hyderabad, Chennai, and Pune because of the simultaneous existence of both 
universities the government had invested in during ISI that supplied the necessary high skilled 
labor for the software industry, and private institutions. The government had provided finance, 
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infrastructural support, legal regulation, and marketing assistance to firms like Tata Consultancy 
Services (TCS) that would initiate software development both for Tata firms and the public 
sector (Patibandla et al., 2000, pp. 1265-1266). Infosys, a public sector firm, was created in 1981 
by using the capital in public sector institutions. Clusters in Bangalore, Hyderabad, and Pune 
reaped the most from the government’s subsidized education during ISI (Patibandla et al., 2000, 
p. 1267) in part because of their pre- existing infrastructural advantages.  
 State-led supply side investment in education and other public expenditures during ISI 
fostered the necessary conditions for the software industry’s success during privatization. During 
trade liberalization, the Indian software industry was open to international trade and 
multinational investment, starting from the early 1980s. Software clusters partnered with other 
multinational firms, thereby gaining more technological knowledge (Patibandla et al., 2000, p. 
1267). The growth of clusters also led to increased intellectual property rights, corporate 
governance, capital markets, and business organizations (Patibandla et al., 2000, p. 1268). 
Growth was primarily driven by exports, and the software industry became characterized as an 
“island of competitiveness” (Patibandla et al., 2000, p. 1263), which it achieved with little 
support from input industries in hardware and telecommunications (Patibandla et al., 2000, p. 
1263). These clusters, though, also gained a disproportionate percentage of the industry’s market 
share (Patibandla et al., 2000, p. 1268).  
Because of weak national demand, the Indian software industry began exporting its 
products. In their respective cities, software clusters built weak inter-industry linkages between 
industries while national demand was not sufficient (Patibandla et al., 2000, p. 1263). 
Additionally, India’s closed-door policy and licensing controls inhibited the competitiveness of 
its industries (Patibandla et al., 2000, p. 1264). In 1972, hardware inputs were allowed for 
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software exports on the condition that the importer earned foreign exchange on the imports 
through software exports (Patibandla et al., 2000, p. 1264).  
Through supply side support via investment in public sector endeavors such as education 
and research/development, the Indian state created the necessary supply side conditions that 
would lead to the software industry’s future success. The Indian state also assisted private firms 
both financially and infrastructurally. Through trade, software hubs “realized” both their 
technological maturity and information externalities, becoming “islands of competitiveness” 
(Patibandla et al., 2000, p. 1267). Firms in Punjab, however, did not receive substantive private 
funding or infrastructural support during this period.  
 
Punjab’s Experience During ISI  
 Because the British state believed Punjab’s strength was agricultural rather than 
industrial, the Indian state did not invest heavily in Punjab’s industrial development during ISI. 
Punjab instead received investments in agriculture both before and after independence. Punjab 
received large public investments towards its power services, scientific research, extension 
services, roads, markets, and other rural infrastructure (Bhalla et al., 1990, p. 9). Other large 
investments were concentrated in education and health: extension services, higher education, and 
agricultural research received investments during the period of ISI (Bhalla et al., 1990, p. 21). 
Agro-processing industries also dominated Punjab’s manufacturing sector; textiles accounted for 
about one-fourth of the total manufacturing activity. The next largest manufacturing sectors 
included food processing and dairy industries (Bhalla et al., 1990, p. 10).  
After ISI, Punjab shifted to some metal-based industries such as bicycles, including some 
manufacturing such as repairing vehicles. Industries during the period, 1979-1980, involved 
basic metals, metal products, drugs, pharmaceuticals, machine goods, and electrical/non 
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electrical machinery (Bhalla et al., 1990, p. 11). The cotton textiles industry remained popular in 
the 1970s and 1980s, along with bicycles, sewing machines, and hand tools (Bhalla et al., 1990, 
p. 28). Despite the very slow growth of the trend towards diversification, agricultural industries 
(agricultural processing sectors) generated the highest backwards and forward linkages in terms 
of wage income and income without import leakages (Bhalla et al., 1990, p. 10).   
 According to Bhalla et al. (1990, p. 13), the share of agriculture decreased throughout the 
period of ISI (1960s to 1980s) from 51.3% to 35% (Bhalla et al., 1990, p. 13). The secondary 
sector increased from 7.3% to 11%; net domestic product increased from 25.4% to 32.8% 
(Bhalla et al., 1990, p. 14). Despite such increases, overall, the primary agricultural sector 
substantially dominated Punjab’s industry. The dominance of the agriculture sector during this 
period is also due to the Green Revolution, which I will discuss in section three.   
The Green Revolution affected the development of industry as the introduction of new 
technology required purchases of modern inputs from other sectors of both the domestic 
economy and from outside of the state (Bhalla et al., 1990, p. 15). Commercial bank credit 
expanded in concert with the growth of the Green Revolution while small-scale agro-processing 
input and consumer goods industries developed (Bhalla et al., 1990, p. 19). Agro-industry 
manufacturing involved the development of machine tools, pipes and fittings, fertilizers, 
automobile parts for tractors, and processing of cotton textiles, sugar, wheat, and flour (Bhalla et 
al., 1990, p. 28); such industries were and continue to be labor-intensive. 
 Punjab’s industrial development even remained contingent upon agricultural-related 
industries while education received substantial funding from the Indian government. Below, in 
section three, I elucidate how the lack of such capital-intensive industries contributed to youth’s 
frustrations, leading them to Sant Bhindranwale’s movements. The Green Revolution further 
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exacerbated smallholders’ vulnerabilities and the Indian government neglected both young men’s 
and smallholders’ demands, fueling the rise of Sikh Fundamentalist Movements in the 1980s. I 
also employ Tsing’s framework of friction in a historical framework to analyze Sikh resistance 
below.  
 
The Green Revolution in Punjab and the Emergence of Sikh Fundamentalist Movements  
In this section, I demonstrate that understanding the rise of Sikh Fundamentalist 
movements in the context of one ‘universal,’ the Green Revolution, is not sufficient alone. 
Rather, a history of imperialism, beginning with British colonization, is synthesized to show how 
the Green Revolution further induced economic vulnerabilities smallholders already faced. 
During the 1980s, Sant Bhindranwale encouraged an amritdhari Sikh identity that not only 
encompassed baptism, but also included keeping kes (hair). Young, educated men first joined 
Sant Bhindranwale’s movement, in part, because they lacked employment prospects in the 
industrial sector, which is a consequence of ISI policies described above. The culmination of 
these ‘universals,’ beginning with British colonization, contributed to the production of friction 
during the Green Revolution. As the central government derived its legitimacy from its Hindu 
stance, it reacted violently to Sikh resistance movements. Below I begin by describing 
‘universals’ and processes of friction. 
 
‘Universals’ and Friction  
Heilbroner (1985, p. 33), a systems theorist, characterizes capitalism as a ‘universal’ 
system that functions to extract wealth from society in the form of capital. He depicts capitalism 
as one system with a defined nature and logic: capitalism retains both a competitive and 
expansive nature that manifests itself in social hierarchy (Heilbroner, 1985, p. 56). The dominant 
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class subordinates the lower class through asserting its economic dominance in a wage 
relationship (Heilbroner, 1985, p. 95). Instead of viewing such political and social entities as 
autonomous, separate spheres, Heilbroner depicts them as part of one, universal system.  
Contrary to systems theorists, Tsing argues capitalism operates in a heterogeneous ways 
as it encounters difference through a process of friction. She (2005, p. 8) states universals 
mobilize and create new forces as they travel across difference. Universals, though, contain 
limits as their forces are dependent on particular historical moments (Tsing, 2005, p. 9). As 
universals engage with localisms, they are reformulated and modified (Tsing, 2005, p. 9). 
Friction occurs through the process of universals engaging with localities; it can be expressed as 
retranslations of the universal in local dialogue (Tsing, 2005, p. 4). Furthermore, friction can also 
manifest in the form of localized resistance (Tsing, 2005, p. 4).  
In this section, I discern the friction produced by the Green Revolution’s engagement in 
Punjabi society manifested in the rise of Sikh Fundamentalist resistance movements, which 
emerged not only as a result of the Green Revolution itself, but were the consequences of 
imperial histories, such as British colonization, that fueled economic precariousness and 
influenced Sikh identity. The Anandpur Resolution highlighted both political and economic 
grievances, in part stemming from the Green Revolution. I begin with an analysis on the Green 
Revolution below.  
 
The Green Revolution in Punjab  
The Green Revolution was essentially a universal ‘package’ implemented across the 
world, framed as a solution to ending both universal hunger and agrarian unrest (Farmer, 1981, 
p. 202). It was supposed to lead to both greater political stability and prosperity (Leaf, 1981-
1982, p. 618) by increasing populations as individuals procured more food. Such a goal is 
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demonstrated by plant-breeder Norman Borlaug’s acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize for 
creating the high-yielding varieties (HYV) of grain (The Contradictions of the Green Revolution, 
p. 1); it is important to consider he received the prize for peace, not a science.   
Despite the way it was framed, the Green Revolution’s efforts entailed “modernizing” the 
countryside through a capitalist system that fostered dependency on new technology as part of 
the nation-building process (The Contradictions of the Green Revolution, p. 5). Because 
smallholders needed to purchase new seeds, the Green Revolution reified their structural 
dependence on a national market in order to obtain such seeds. It aimed to transform agrarian 
social and political relations by integrating isolated areas and farmers into a capitalist market 
system. 
Corporations supplied inputs to farmers, institutionalizing the transfer of technical 
knowledge (The Contradictions of the Green Revolution, p. 6). They profited from this venture 
of capitalism: both bilateral and multilateral financing included irrigation systems, imports for 
inputs such as tractors and fertilizers, and joint production ventures in order to maximize profits. 
It also involved a monopoly and control of agrochemicals, seed corporations, and international 
research centers (Shiva, 1991). The Green Revolution is a capitalist, imperialist venture in the 
“third-world.” Nations such as India may have gained independence, but imperialist pursuits by 
external actors certainly did not end.  
The American government and international organizations played a large role in applying 
the Green Revolution to India. International agencies such as the World Bank transferred the 
American model of agriculture, which relied on intensifying control over nature, to India (Shiva, 
1991, p. 29). The Rockefeller Foundation remodeled India’s agricultural research team in 1953 
while the Ford Foundation trained and extended agriculture in 1952. Additionally, between the 
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periods of 1956 and 1970, grants were awarded to Indian leaders so that they could witness 
American agricultural institutes (Shiva, 1991, p. 30). The World Bank provided the credit to 
apply a capital-intensive agricultural model to India; along with USAID, the World Bank 
provided the financial means for the Green Revolution. After the Indian drought in 1966, U.S. 
president Lyndon B. Johnson refused to deliver desperately needed food aid until India agreed to 
purchase and utilize the technology of the Green Revolution (Shiva, 1991, p. 32). The impact of 
this international involvement was largely concentrated in Punjab, which contained the 
demanded irrigation systems as a result of Britain’s imperial pursuits: eighty-four percent of 
Punjab’s geographical area was under cultivation during the Green Revolution compared to 
forty-two percent for India as a whole (Shiva, 1991, p. 83).  
The Green Revolution of the 1960s introduced newer, high yielding varieties of cereals, 
chemical fertilisers, intesticides, and pesticides, along with new methods of cultivation in Punjab 
(Farmer, 1981, 202). Varieties it focused on included both wheat and rice (Leaf, 1980-1891, p. 
618). Scholars such as Leaf (1980-1981, p. 625) illustrate that a ‘revolution’ occurred in Punjab 
as a result of the Green Revolution: other than the introduction of new cropping patterns and the 
increases in overall income, ‘progressive’ changes occurred between the villagers and the state 
due to the improved technology wrought on by agricultural marketization.  
However, scholars such as Shiva (1991) argue that because the Green Revolution both 
degraded crop diversity and introduced new methods of intensification, it harmed ecosystems. 
The Green Revolution packaged GMOs as superior seeds, further degrading the diversity of 
indigenous seeds in Punjab. Mixtures and rotation of diverse crops such as wheat, millets, maize, 
pulses, and oilseeds were substituted for monocultures of wheat and rice (Shiva, 1991, p. 81). 
Furthermore, the new wheat and rice varieties originated from a very narrow genetic base (Shiva, 
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1991, p. 81). Wheat was grown at the expense of crops mixed with traditional wheat varieties, 
such as gram, barley, and mustard (Shiva, 1991, p. 83). The area under paddy also expanded at 
the expense of maize, moong and masoor, green fodder, and groundnut (Shiva, 1991, p. 86).  
 Even though Shiva posits large-scale commodification and the degradation of crop 
diversity began with the Green Revolution, it dates back to British colonization. The British first 
initiated homogenization as they transformed large acres of land into irrigation farming as shown 
in the first section. Because the British laid the groundwork for the success of crops such as 
wheat, the Green Revolution built on such existing institutions. Even during colonization, the 
British experimented with developing new varieties of wheat; likewise, the Green Revolution 
further “advanced” crop varieties, including wheat and rice, through GMO (genetically modified 
organism) seeds (Shiva, 1991, p. 120). While Britain exercised authority during colonization, 
corporations increasingly exercised control with the advent of the Green Revolution.  
For example, the genetic breeding, which “optimizes” crop yields and creates GMOs is 
controlled by major corporations. Genetic engineering is largely at the hands of multinational 
corporations: eighty-percent of research and development of commercial GMOs is controlled by 
private groups and a few in the public sector (Kaur et al., 2013, p. 624). Genetic engineering is 
expensive; profitable GMO crops also continue to be restricted to large landowners that can 
practice both monoculture and economies of scale, which widened the gap between the rich and 
poor (Kaur et al., 2013, p. 625).  
In Punjab, the Green Revolution both exacerbated existing inequalities between 
smallholders and wealthier landowners, leading to the increase in rural unemployment. The 
number of holdings each small farmer possessed declined during the 1980s as smallholders 
continued to lease out land to both medium and large farmers (Singh, 2002, p. 1626). Already, 
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during the period of British colonization, smallholders struggled to retain their lands especially 
due to their indebtedness and further agricultural marketization. During the time of the Green 
Revolution, land was not redistributed on large scale, either in order to assist smallholders. The 
ratio of landless workers in the total agricultural workforce also increased from seventeen 
percent in 1961 to thirty-two percent in 1971; thirty-one percent of marginal farmers lived below 
the poverty line (Puri, 1983, p. 116).  
Additionally, the surge in land prices along with ecological unsustainability heightened 
smallholders’ economic vulnerabilities. Already pressed by their vulnerable economic situation, 
smallholders also resisted as the Indian government began to centralize institutions belonging to 
Punjab. The intensification of the Green Revolution put pressures on Punjab’s irrigation systems, 
leading to tensions between the central government and smallholders as the Indian government 
also attempted to coerce Punjab into sharing its water. Smallholders’ economic grievances, 
originating from British colonization and continuing during the Green Revolution, translated into 
political ones as the Indian government began to centralize Punjab’s institutions.  
Tensions escalated as the government centralized the water board and seized Chandigarh. 
The Indian government, under the 1966 Punjab Reorganization Act, centralized the water system 
due to heightened irrigation demands (Shiva, 1991, p. 148). Under this law, the government set 
up the Bhakra Management Board, which supplied water from the Bhakra Nangal Project to the 
states of Haryana, Punjab, and Rajasthan (Shiva, 1991, p. 147). The law also signified the split of 
Punjab in to Haryana and Punjab on the basis of language (Shiva, 1991, p. 147). Tensions 
heightened as the centre forced Punjab into sharing its water with the other regions at a rate it did 
not agree with: Haryana claimed 4.8 MAF out of the total 7.2 MAF allocated to Punjab, but 
Punjab believed it deserved the entire 7.2 MAF: its own farmers needed the water, especially as 
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rice consumed a substantial amount of water (Shiva, 1991, p. 148). Punjab also claimed the 
water systems and canals Haryana asserted it deserved remained in Punjab’s geographical region 
(Shiva, 1991, p. 152). As the central government further forced small farmers to construct the 
canal system to Haryana despite resistances, small farmers resisted by refusing to build the canal 
(Shiva, 1991, p. 164-166). President’s Rule was also instituted in Chandigarh, Punjab’s capital 
city, as both Haryana and Punjab shared it at the time (Gupta, 1985, p. 1187).  
Smallholders expressed their economic and political grievances in the Anandpur 
Resolution, which called for a greater share of water for Punjab (Shiva, 1991, p. 50) (as needed 
to meet the demands of the Green Revolution) and Chandigarh’s return back to Punjab (Gupta, 
1985, p. 1187). As the Green Revolution reproduced past economic grievances and played a role 
in introducing political ones, such grievances were translated in the Anandpur Resolution.  
 The central government, however, considered the Resolution secessionist, and dismissed 
it (Gupta, 1985, p. 1187). When the Akalis brought the water dispute case to the supreme court, 
the central government withdrew it in 1978 under false pretenses as they claimed the Akalis were 
“unpatriotic” and acted “unneighborly” in court (Gupta, 1985, p. 1187). The central government 
further claimed if Punjab did want Chandigarh back, it was to sacrifice the cities Abohar and 
Fazila to Haryana (Gupta, 1985, p. 1187).  
Sikh resistance escalated as young men of lower, rural classes agitated over economic 
grievances that stemmed both from the Green Revolution and Import Substitution 
Industrialization policies that had neglected the substantial development of Punjab’s industry. As 
discussed in section two, ISI constituted government investments in Punjab: rural Jats from 
poorer farming classes attended universities in the city in order to receive an education; despite 
promises of modernization from the Indian government, young men substantially remained 
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unemployed (Telford, 1992, pp. 977-979). Also elucidated in section two is that Punjab was not 
favored as the industrial “center,” so it did not possess technologically advanced industries 
besides some manufacturing, textile, and automobile industries. Thus, educated young men from 
universities could not obtain jobs in the cities, and could not effectively participate in 
‘modernism’ as Punjab had been historically neglected as an industrial center, dating back to 
British colonization. Nor could these young men gain attributable employment in the rural sector 
as their families already struggled financially, further constraining their options for employment 
(Telford, 1992, pp. 977-981).  
During colonization, although smaller farmers served as petty commodity producers, they 
shifted to serving as laborers and tenants of wealthier landowners, especially after the Great 
Economic Depression in the late 1920s and early 1930s. The Green Revolution also mainly 
benefited wealthier classes as they could afford the newer, ‘technologically advanced’ inputs. 
The lower classes remained excluded from accessing all the necessary inputs the Green 
Revolution required, unless they expanded the enormous amount of debt they already shouldered 
from the years prior to the Green Revolution, dating back to British colonization.  
Not only was the unemployment rate substantially high for young men from rural classes, 
but few opportunities existed outside of the rural sector. It was estimated that 185,000 youth in 
Punjab were unemployed at the time (Telford, 1992, p. 981). Punjab received educational 
investments, but ISI did not lead to the development of technologically advanced industries in 
Punjab. A RNF (rural non-farm sector) was not promoted in Punjab, but should have been 
because market uncertainties created dire conditions for poor rural classes already living on the 
margins (Vatta and Garg, 2008, p. 225). Combined with rural unemployment, the lack of 
institutional and sectorial opportunities in other sectors did not help to alleviate decades of 
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economic ills for both smallholders and young men. The British mainly invested in sectors and 
crops that aided them in their imperial empire; they did not create such substantial alternative 
institutional mechanisms to protect smallholders from market vulnerabilities the Indian 
government could then build on, simply because it did not aid their imperial world pursuits as a 
hegemon.  
Furthermore, the Akali Party struggled to uphold its legitimacy in Punjab. Historically, 
even after the Haryana-Punjab split, the Akalis struggled electorally. In 1966, Haryana split from 
Punjab in order to encompass a Hindi-speaking majority while Punjab constituted the Punjabi 
speaking, largely Sikh majority; Sikhs composed sixty percent of the population in Punjab while 
in Haryana-Punjab as a whole, they comprised only thirty-three percent of the population 
(Telford, 1992, pp. 970-971). After the split, the Akalis continued their inclusive politics in order 
to also appeal to non-Sikhs. Because they did not cater specifically to the now-majority Sikh 
demographic, the Akalis suffered electoral losses both in 1972 and 1980 (Telford, 1992, p. 970). 
Beginning with their loss in 1972, the Akalis attempted to appease Sikh constituencies as 
smallholders agitated against the centralization of the water board (Telford, 1992, p. 971). Both 
smallholders’ and young men’s economic and political grievances expressed themselves through 
their religious polarization. Knowing this, Punjab’s local government attempted to cater to these 
sects politically.   
 In an effort to accommodate educated young men, the Akalis formed the All India Sikh 
Students Federation (AISSF) in 1943 to further ally with the Sikh intelligentsia (Telford, 1992, p. 
981). The Akalis organized conferences, study circles, and training camps for educated youth 
(Telford, 1992, p. 981). While the Akalis attempted to attract the members of the AISSF, 
frustrated, unemployed young men were more drawn to Sant Bhindranwale's militant movement, 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SIKH CONSCIOUSNESS OF NATIONHOOD                            
 
33 
and organized themselves under the Damdami Taksal (Telford, 1992, p. 981). The Akalis sought 
to represent this demographic’s interests as well, joining Bhindranwale to lead the dharam yudh 
morcha (righteous struggle) movement to pressure Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to accept the 
demands of the Anandpur Resolution (Telford, 1992, p. 984). The Indian government’s policies, 
which built on Britain’s economic institutions and continued to treat Punjab as a breadbasket 
region throughout the ISI and Green Revolution periods contributed to the friction that expressed 
as the rise in Sikh militant movements during the 1980s.  
Both Akalis and Sant Bhindranwale also advocated for an amritdhari Sikh identity. The 
Akalis incited baptismal campaigns in villages, encouraging Sikhs to baptize (amrit prachar) 
(Kinnvall, 2002, p. 96). A requirement of baptism is abiding by the five k’s. Keeping kes (hair) is 
one important requirement for Sikh baptism. The Singh Sabha movement, in 1873, led by urban 
Sikhs, advocated for a keshdhari Sikh identity (Telford, 1992, pp. 970-971). An identity that is 
contingent upon kes, or keeping hair, resembles a masculine Sikh identity that differentiates itself 
from clean-shaven Hindus and Muslims. A masculine Sikh identity, differentiating itself from 
Hindus, was encouraged by both the colonial state and urban Sikhs as they led reformation 
movements in the countryside during the time of British colonization (see section one). The 
British also favored a masculine Sikh identity due to their desires to recruit Sikhs in their armies. 
The dharam yudh morcha movement possessed an ideology of fundamentalism, seeking to 
represent an exclusivist, Sikh individualism embodying an amritdhari identity, which fostered a 
more exclusive Sikh identity as it encompassed both baptism and the five k’s (Singh, 1987, p. 
1269).  
 Sikhs further radicalized, as they demanded the central government meet their grievances 
expressed in the dharam yudh morcha movement (Kinnvall, 2002, p. 96). Sant Bhindranwale’s 
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rise helped transform Sikh consciousness from marginalized peoples to one of embodying their 
own nationhood (Singh, 1987, p. 1269). He collectivized Sikhs, frustrated from unjust political 
and economic systems, into a militaristic movement. The dharam yudh morcha movement 
manifested in a fundamentalist character as Sant Bhindranwale inspired a Sikh revivalism based 
off of an amritdhari identity. Although Sant Bhindranwale never explicitly demanded the Sikh 
nation, Khalistan (Sikh homeland), he stated if it were given, Sikhs would take the opportunity 
for nationhood (Singh, 1987, p. 1269).  
The dharam yudh morcha movement unified Sikhs into a common struggle and laid the 
groundwork for Sikh Fundamentalist movements, especially as both political and economic 
grievances continued unresolved from the years prior (Telford, 1992, p. 984). The rise of Sikh 
nationalism was then not only a result of the Green Revolution itself or Sikhism’s inherent 
distinctiveness, but grew out of years of economic marginalization and the progression of a 
masculine, Sikh identity the British had encouraged, manifesting as friction in the form of a 
localized dharam yudh morcha movement during the 1980s. The dharam yudh morcha 
movement gained impetus as it grew to not only include members of the AISFF, but also 
incorporate frustrated smallholders as well (Telford, 1992, pp. 984-985).  
Regions where Sikh Fundamentalism appealed the most included Gurdaspur and 
Amritsar, where large proportions of smallholders lived (Telford, 1992, pp. 976-977). During 
colonization, the British targeted central Punjab for the purposes of recruitment in the army by 
providing financial incentives. Smallholder economic grievances continued post-independence, 
perpetuated by the Green Revolution while the Hindu nationalist state not only added to 
economic grievances, but also refused to acknowledge their legitimacy. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SIKH CONSCIOUSNESS OF NATIONHOOD                            
 
35 
The Akalis attempted to appease Sant Bhindranwale in order to maintain their power, but 
through supporting his rise, they also undermined their own legitimacy. This came to a head 
during the Nirankari clash, which legitimized Bhindranwale's authority in the Damdami Taksal 
(Telford, 1992, p. 976-977). The Nirankari Sikhs believed in a living Guru instead of scriptural 
one, unlike orthodox Sikhs. The Sant Nirankaris organized a convention on April 13, 1978, but 
members of the Damdami Taksal perceived this to be an insult to Sikhism as the date coincided 
with Baisakhi, an important Sikh religious holiday. Sikhs from the Damdami Taksal attempted to 
prevent the Nirankari organization, leading to a clash that resulted in sixteen deaths (Telford, 
1992, pp. 976-977). 
 Sant Bhindranwale orchestrated his own arrest for the murders of Nirankaris publicly; he 
proclaimed his innocence, and surrendered to the police (Telford, 1992, p. 984). The Akalis, 
aiming to retain their power among their Sikh constituency, swiftly released Sant Bhindranwale 
from jail (Telford, 1992, p. 984). Sant Bhindranwale also demanded his “blood brother,” Amrik 
Singh, be released from jail as well, who was also arrested for the murders of Nirankaris 
(Telford, 1992, p. 984). The Akalis ceded to the demands, but after Amrik Singh’s release in July 
1983, Sant Bhindranwale abandoned the Akali Party, undermining its authority. 
During this time, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi classified the Sikh Fundamentalist 
movements as ‘terroristic,’ hoping to marginalize this extremist group to for electoral gain. First, 
Indira Gandhi classified Sikh resistances as a “national threat,” and she aimed to justify 
searching for and prosecuting leaders of the fundamentalist movements that included Sant 
Bhindranwale and his followers. Rhetoric concerning Punjab transformed from “The Punjab 
Problem” to a “Sikh threat;” the threat was articulated within the rhetoric of the bounds of the 
Hindu nationalist state (Singh, 1987, p. 1273). Despite Gandhi’s rhetoric, her real concern 
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remained electoral: the midterm elections in 1982 and 1983 predicted the Congress Party’s 
possible defeat (Singh, 1987, p. 1273). Gandhi’s tone became authoritarian, as it had during the 
Emergency; she labeled Sant Bhindranwale and his followers as ‘terrorists,’ seeking to arrest 
them. Bhindranwale and his followers established their refuge in Sri Harmandir Sahib (or the 
Golden Temple). 
Under Operation Bluestar, Indira Gandhi violently struck at the Golden Temple, igniting 
outrage by Sikhs. The military operation to remove the militants from the Golden Temple 
consisted of three phases: phase I entailed clearing the militants from the building, phase II 
demanded the capturing of militants from the complex as well as extinguishing fires or repairing 
structural damage to the site, and finally, phase III involved fighting against resistances in other 
parts of the state (Hussain, 2014). In Akal Takht (located in Sri Harmandir Sahib), tank fire and 
chemical gases were used to murder militants (Hussain, 2014). Two tanks fired about twenty 
shells at Akal Takht; militants were killed in the attack or murdered and captured by Indian 
officials. Sant Bhindranwale, as well as many civilians, did not survive the attack. Important 
Sikh archives caught in the fire during the attack (Hussain, 2014).  
While the exact number of civilians murdered remains controversial, Sikhs claim 
thousands of civilians were killed while the Indian government states the numbers ranged in the 
hundreds. Quickly, outrage and discontent spread in the Sikh community because the methods 
employed by the Indian army devastated the lives of so many civilians (Hussain, 2014). 
Furthermore, the army could have first attempted less violent measures: for example, they could 
have cut the water and electric supply, which would have eventually forced the militants to 
surrender (Hussain, 2014). As outrage spread, Gandhi’s two Sikh bodyguards assassinated her 
(Hussain, 2014).   
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Following Indira Gandhi’s assassination in Delhi on October 31, 1984, Hindu mobs 
violently murdered, tortured, and raped Sikhs within days of the assassination across the nation 
(Das, 1985, p. 4). By November 3, 1984, it was clear the Indian police supported the killings, and 
did not act to stop the murders (Das, 1985, p. 4). The army did not take responsibility for helping 
victims, either (Das, 1985, p. 4). In some cases, upper-class Sikhs were able to escape with only 
property damage with the support of other upper-caste individuals, but lower-class Sikhs became 
the targets of horrific violence. When asked about the killings, Rajiv Gandhi (the son of Indira 
Gandhi) encouraged the killings, by stating (in translation): “when a big tree falls, the Earth 
shakes” (Daily News and Analysis). 
 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, the friction manifesting itself as the rise of Sikh Fundamentalist 
movements in the 1980s, which sparked a Sikh consciousness of nationhood, is the result of 
imperial legacies traced back to British colonization and continued with the ISI and Green 
Revolution periods. Young men, frustrated by the lack of opportunities in both the industrial and 
rural sector, collectivized themselves in Sant Bhindranwale’s dharam yudh morcha movement, 
along with smallholders in precarious financial positions. Both smallholders and educated young 
men first translated their grievances with the Anandpur Resolution, but the central government 
considered it ‘secessionist,’ thus further radicalizing Sikh resistance movements.  
The British laid the impetus for both young men and smallholders’ political and 
economic grievances during the 1980s through large-scale agricultural commodification and 
military recruitment. Smallholders joined the military as it provided financial incentives; the 
colonial state also encouraged an exclusive Sikh identity that contributed to the emergence of 
Sikh Fundamentalist movements in the 1980s, which also advocated for an exclusive, amritdhari 
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identity. The Green Revolution in the 1960s built on Britain’s agricultural institutions in Punjab, 
introducing new forms of market vulnerabilities for smallholders, who had already struggled 
financially since the British first marketized agriculture. During ISI, the Indian state neglected 
Punjab’s industrial sector, but favored other historically privileged centers of manufacturing and 
commerce, such as Bangalore and Hyderabad.  
As Prime Minister Indira Gandhi considered Sikh Fundamentalist resistance secessionist, 
she led the Indian army to brutally attack the Golden Temple, which sparked Sikh outrage. Indira 
Gandhi’s assassination led to the tragedy of the Sikh Genocide of 1984. As economic grievances 
induced by the British continue unresolved, Sikhism will continue as militant, especially as 
further marketization exacerbates smallholders’ financial positions. Because the Indian state 
refuses to properly acknowledge the violence it enacted against Sikhs, those grievances will also 
remain unaddressed, further fueling Sikhs’ frustrations. As long as the Hindu nationalist state 
derives its legitimacy from ‘othering’ religious minorities with violent, authoritarian swings, 
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